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[MJothers have been told that 
they must not resist impulses to 
control their children, but must 




For most of us, the word "mother" evokes a myriad of often 
conflicting images and emotions, expectations and disappoint-
ments, and gratitude and blame. What a mother is - our own 
mothers and the class of people who are mothers - means much 
more than that a woman has given birth. We expect mothers to 
provide their children with all the love, caring, nurturing, and 
emotional fulfillment that we perceive those children need and 
desire; we expect her to be all things that we want her to be when 
we need her to be them. A woman who can fulfill the expecta-
tions of her children and of her community is viewed as a good 
mother. If she cannot - or if she does not - she is bad. 
Mothers who are self-sacrificing, who place the needs or desires 
of their children before everything else, especially themselves, are 
the good ones. Mothers who decide that any aspect of their lives 
has greater value than, or is co-equal with their concern for their 
children, are the bad ones. I 
Notions of what constitutes a good mother are inextricably 
bound up with ideas about what constitutes a good woman. Many 
of these ideas come from traditionalists who believe in narrowly-
defined roles for women. Our biology is seen as being our des-
tiny: to move too far outside those pre-determined roles is viewed 
as being harmful for women and the larger society. Recently, 
however, a growing number of women who consider themselves 
feminists have been willing to consign women to similarly narrow 
roles. For these feminists, real women are those who are care-
givers and nurturers at home and in the workplace? Some would 
even agree with the traditionalists that the highest calling for a 
woman is as a mother.J Real women and real mothers, however, 
are much more ambivalent about their relationships with their 
children and their status as mothers than traditional stereotypes 
and other pro-motherhood forces would have us believe. 
My mother achieved her status as mother four months after 
marriage and three months after graduation from college. Her 
plans had been to spend this time exploring the world and explor-
ing herself. Instead, she found herself with a new husband and 
often a sick child to take care of. After my parents' divorce, my 
mother always spoke harshly about her pre-marital and marital 
relationship with my father. The harangue would always end, 
however, with her saying, "But 1 never regretted having my child-
ren." 1 cannot help but wonder whether that is true. Surely there 
must have been some yearning for what she gave up, regardless of 
the joy she may have found in being a mother. Other mothers 
with whom 1 have spoken have shared their ambivalence with me. 
One friend, a very new mother, said to me, "1 iove my baby. You 
know 1 do. But sometimes 1 look at him and think, 'What have 1 
done?'" A woman at work stopped me one evening and asked me 
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in had any children. When I told her that I did not, she respond-
ed, "You are blessed. You may not think you are, but you are 
blessed. The problem with children is that they never go away.,,4 
This woman is the mother of five adult children. 
This article will discuss the role of images of mothers in 
American law and how women often have to reconstruct them-
selves to fit those images, even when they do not comport with 
women's experience. It will first examine the American 
jurisprudential view of the relationship between parents, and 
particularly mothers, and their children. Parents are presumed to 
be the best caretakers for their children, and mothers to be the best 
caretakers of the caretakers. This position, firmly rooted in theor-
ies of natural law and property rights, declares the parent-child 
relationship fundamental. Although the state may infrequently 
interfere in this relationship of parental unit to child, and the 
fundamental relationship between the parental unit and child even 
may be severed if the state has a compelling interest in doing so, 
the state can and does interfere regularly in the mother-child 
relationship and, in some circumstances, terminates that relation-
ship altogether. Often that termination is not based on the mother 
having harmed the child, but rather on the mother exhibiting the 
characteristics of being a bad woman. Since bad women can 
never be good mothers, their relationships with their children are 
terminated on that basis. 
The Nature of the Parent-Child Relationship 
Natural Law and Property Theories 
In In re Lisa H,5 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
stated succinctly the American legal ideology governing the 
parent-child relationship: "[A] parent's authority is not only a 
natural and essential right which is prior to the State itself, it is an 
obligation.,,6 Three major themes govern the relationship: first, 
that the parents have a fundamental right to their children and to 
authority over them; second, that the relationship does not derive 
from, but is prior to the state, and is "natural,,;7 and finally, that 
the right to and the authority over children carries obligations to 
care for the children. American legal ideology concerning the 
nature of the parent-child relationship was imported from British 
common law, which was itself rooted in centuries-old ideas about 
the parent-child relationship. Intertwined with natural law notions 
were ideas that children were also the property of their parents, 
and more specifically, the property of the father. 
Blackstone's commentaries reflect the tradition of viewing 
the parent-child relationship as rooted in nature. He declares as 
fact that parents have natural affection for their children and that 
such natural affection causes them to discharge their obligations 
towards their children: 
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The municipal laws of all well-regulated states have 
taken care to enforce this duty [of parents to care for 
their children]: though providence has done it more 
effectually than any laws, by implanting in the breast 
of every parent that natural o'topY'Il or insuperable 
degree of affection, which not even the deformity of 
person or mind, not even the wickedness, ingratitude, 
and rebellion of children, can totally suppress or 
extinguish. 8 
Blackstone's description of the common law also includes a view 
of the parent-child relationship as contractual by arguing that 
parents have entered into a voluntary obligation to care for their 
children by virtue of having begotten them: 
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of 
their children, is a principle of natural law; an oblig-
ation ... laid on them not only by nature herself, but 
by their own proper act, in bringing them into the 
world: for they would be in the highest manner in-
jurious to their issue, if they only gave their children 
life, that they might afterwards see them perish. By 
begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a 
voluntary obligation, to endeavour, as far as in them 
lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be 
supported and preserved. And thus the children will 
have a perfect right of receiving maintenance from 
their parents.9 
The result of Blackstone's analysis is that parents and not the 
sovereign nor the state are ultimately responsible for the care of 
their children.lo 
Contemporary American jurisprudence, though it permits 
state intervention in the parent-child relationship to an unpre-
cedented degree, continues the tradition of viewing the parent-
child relationship as one rooted in nature itself. Parents are 
viewed as the people who, by virtue of conception, know what is 
in the best inteI:ests of their children. In Meyer v. Nebraska, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that a state statute prohibiting 
teaching children German in school unconstitutionally infringed 
on their parents' right to control their children's education. II The 
holding of unconstitutionality was based, in part, on the premise 
that adults have a right "to marry, establish a home, and bring up 
children.,,12 Pierce v. Society o/the Sisters o/the Holy Names 0/ 
Jesus and Mary, decided two years after Meyer, held that children 
could not be prohibited from attending parochial or private 
schools; the Supreme Court reiterated its earlier holding that 
parents had a right to direct the education of their children: 
The child is not the mere creature of the state; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 
Myths and Moms 
coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations. 13 The American law 
mother's husband was more compelling than 
the birth father's right to have a state-sanc-
tioned relationship with his child. In addition, 
the mother's husband gained rights of inheri-
tance from the child and denied the birth 
father any right to inherit property from his 
daughter. 23 
The Supreme Court's position has been 
echoed in Stanley v. Illinois,14 Lassiter v. 
Department of Socia I Services,ls and Santos-
ky v. Kramer.16 The fundamental nature of 
the relationship is now firmly embedded in 
American law. 17 
The natural law which governs the 
parent-child relationship simultaneously 
confers upon parents a kind of property 
interest in their children. Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse suggests that as well as being 
premised on a natural law theory, Meyer and 
Pierce are also premised on a parental pro-
perty interest in children. IS Granting parents 
control over their children also means that 
parents have control over their earnings and 
assets. Indeed, parents have a right to expect 
their children to care for them should they be 
tradition bases the 
parent-child 
relationship both 
on theories of 
natural law and 




state . ... 
The American law tradition bases the 
parent-child relationship both on theories of 
natural law and property law. The relation-
ship is viewed as pre-existing the state, al-
though, as in Michael H., it can be shaped by 
the state. These theories, however, are based 
on premises about how parents relate to their 
children that may not be accurate. 
Natural Law and Harm to Children 
The natural law theory of the parent-
child relationship has not always been benefi-
cial to the children themselves. Declaring that 
parents are to be the only caretakers for their 
unable to care for themselves. In this respect 
then, parents have an interest not only in their children as a divine 
right, but also because they have an interest in the tangible 
benefits that may be derived from their children. 
The property interest in the parent-child relationship is, at 
least in part, the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Michael 
H. v. Gerald D.19 In that case, a child's birth father filed an action 
to establish paternity and visitation rights. Unfortunately, he was 
not the same man who was the mother's husband. A California 
statute created a presumption that the mother's husband at the 
time of the child's birth was the father of the child and did not 
permit a purported birth father to chalIenge paternity.20 The birth 
father sought to have the statute declared unconstitutional on the 
basis of its violating his substantive due process rights. After alI, 
natural law should protect his rights to have a state-sanctioned 
relationship with his birth child. Moreover, the birth father had 
lived together with the child and her mother while the mother was 
separated from her husband; a true emotional relationship between 
them had been established. 
The Supreme Court rejected the birth father's contention.21 
It stated that the common law had created the irrebuttable pre-
sumption that a woman's husband was the father of her children, 
in part, to prevent children from being deprived of the rights of 
inheritance and succession.22 In other words, even though the 
natural law would seem to dictate that the relationship between the 
birth father and the child would be stamped with the state's 
imprimatur, the property interests involved superseded the natural 
law result. The right of the child to inherit property from the 
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children has meant that practices such as 
infanticide, abandonment, exposure, mutila-
tion, and other forms of physical and mental cruelty have been 
performed without legal intervention.24 One need only think of 
the mythological stories of Oedipus2s or Romulus and Remus26 to 
appreciate how stories of child abuse permeate ancient culture. 
The American view of the parent-child relationship as being 
virtualIy inviolable continued until the dawn of the twentieth 
century. In State v. Jones,27 for example, criminal charges were 
brought against a father accused of beating his sixteen-year-old 
daughter. The girl testified at trial that he: 
[W]as a man of bad temper and frequently whipped 
her without any cause; that on one occasion he 
whipped her at the gate in front of his house, giving 
her about twenty-five blows with a switch, or smalI 
limb, about the size of one's thumb or forefmger, with 
such force as to raise whelks upon her back, and then 
going into the house, he soon returned and gave her 
five blows more with the same switch, choked her, and 
threw her violently to the ground, causing a dislocation 
of her thumb joint; that she had given him no offense; 
that she did not know for what she was beaten, nor did 
he give her any reason for it during the time.28 
The father's conviction was overturned on the basis that the 
trial court's jury instruction was erroneous. The trial court had 
instructed the jury that the punishment need only be cruel and 
excessive to be criminal. In order to secure a conviction, the 
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reviewing court stated, the state would have to prove that penna-
nent injury resulted, or was conducted with malicious motive or 
without corrective authority.29 
On the one hand, then, there is an historical belief that 
parents are the best caretakers for their children. On the other, 
there is evidence that in many instances those "naturally" charged 
with caring for their children have failed to do so. Even now, and 
apart from those instances in which parents affinnatively abuse 
their children, there are numerous examples of individual parents 
or even entire societies which make it clear that caring for 
children is not a high priority. A study of the Ik, a small tribe in 
Uganda, for example, concluded that there was little parent-child 
bonding within the groUp.30 Children were viewed as competitors 
for food, were routinely turned away from the parental home at 
the age of three, and might be laughed at by adults if hurt or 
killed.3! Similarly, after the overthrow of the Communist regime 
in Romania in 1989, parents were willing to sell their children for 
video cassette recorders.32 Especially in societies in which 
resources are scarce, and even in some where they are not,33 
children may have to be protected from their parents far more than 
they can rely on their parents to take care of them. 
The recognition that parents do indeed abuse their children 
has resulted in a tension between the ideology of parents as the 
best caretakers for their children and a beliefthat when parents do 
not care for their children properly, either through neglecting them 
or through affrrmatively harming them, the state has the obligation 
to care for the children. This tension is one of the reasons for the 
creation of the American juvenile justice system. 
Under the parens patriae theory of the state's relationship to 
its citizens, the state has the power, if not the obligation, to 
protect its child citizens from abusive and neglectful parents as 
well as to protect the larger society from the effects of that abuse 
and neglect. From requiring that children receive childhood 
immunization as a pre-condition to receiving public education, to 
deeming certain child-rearing practices as wrongful, the state can 
and does control the manner in which parents raise their children. 
Still, American jurisprudence, and indeed Americans themselves, 
have been unwilling to declare that this kind of state intervention 
amounts to the state being a super-parent, the parent which has the 
authority and the enforcement capability to do those things which, 
in the state's conception, are in the child's best interest. Although 
briefly in vogue,34 the concept of parents as simply being the 
state's caretakers for children, has come to be seen as almost 
Orwellian.35 
Whether parents are deemed to have a fundamental right to 
the care of their children or whether the state is seen as a super-
parent for whom parents care for children, there are special 
expectations of mothers. Their role in the raising of children is 
deemed different than that of fathers, and failure to live up to 
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those expectations can result in the social and legal sanction of 
women. 
rhe Role of Mothers in the Parent-Child Relationship 
Mothers are seen as being better equipped - physically, 
psychologically, emotionally, and mentally - to take primary 
responsibility for raising their children. This is so even though the 
only thing that, post-birth, a mother can do that a father cannot is 
lactate. Fathers who provide for their children materially are 
often commended for being good fathers; mothers who provide 
only materially for their children are seen as having deprived their 
children of the care and attention that they need. 
Historical and cultural antecedents have helped create 
mythologies36 of motherhood. The Biblical story of Solomon's 
judgmenf7 provides but one of many cultural exemplars of good 
and bad mothers. In that often-told story, two women come to 
Solomon each declaring that a male child belongs to her. 
Solomon decides that the "true" mother of the child is she whose 
"bowels yearned" for her child at the prospect of his being harmed 
by Solomon's proposed judgment of dividing the child in two.3S 
The true mother - the good mother - is she who is willing to 
give up being a mother to protect her child. The good mother is 
she who is willing to give up her power and possession for the 
sake of her child. The non-mother - the bad mother - on the 
other hand, is she who is willing to do violence to her child.39 
In addition to the story of the true mother in the Solomonic 
story, Moses's birth mother, who protected her child in spite of 
the Egyptian edict that he be killed,40 and his adoptive mother, 
whose maternal instinct compels her to care for a child she found 
floating on a river,4! serve as cultural exemplars of good mothers. 
Indeed, Biblical stories proclaim that motherhood is a special 
blessing bestowed upon those women who have obeyed God;42 
those who are disobedient may be made barren.43 The mythology 
creates mothers who are blessed women who should be willing to 
give up advantages and privileges because of their status as 
mothers. 
American jurisprudence has built upon and added to 
mythologies about mothers and mothering. Supreme Court 
decisions which have characterized the mother-child relationship 
have outlined what the proper role of women as mothers is. In 
Bradwell v. Illinois,44 for example, an opinion concurring in 
Illinois' denying a woman a license to practice law says: 
The constitution of the farnily organization, which is 
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the 
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that 
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of 
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity of 
interests and views which belong, or should belong, to 
the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a 
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during the war described the author's debili-woman adopting a distinct and inde-
pendent career from that of her hus-
band . . . . [T]he paramount destiny 
and mission of woman are to fulfill the 
noble and benign offices of wife and 
mother.45 
Similarly, in Muller v. Oregon,46 the 
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional 
state restrictions on working hours for men, 
but not restrictions on women: 
Today, mothers are 
. .. charged with 
raising their 
children to meet 
standards that they 
did not create. 
tating trauma and hospitalization because of 
her father's absence while he fought overseas 
in World War II. On the basis of the harm 
suffered due to her father's absence, she 
concludes that mothers should never be sent 
to war. 52 
The controversy surrounding poor, 
African-American "single-parent (female-
headed) households" and their effect on young 
African-American men53 represents a conver-
gence of the ideology of both the traditional-
Even though all restrictions on 
political, personal, and contract-
ual rights were taken away, ... it would still be true 
that [woman] is so constituted that she will rest upon 
and look to [man] for protection; that her physical 
structure and a proper discharge of her maternal 
functions - having in view not merely her own health, 
but the well-being of the race - justify legislation to 
protect her .... [T]he limitations ... are not imposed 
solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of 
al1.47 
Celebration of women 's highest calling being mothering, and 
of women as the best caretakers for their children extends into the 
latter twentieth century. During the 1970s and 80s, there was a 
plethora of media coverage concerning the harm to children of 
having their mothers work, as well as popular literature that 
warned women that they should remain home with their children. 
In an era when women continue to strive for equality of dignity 
and respect in their public and private relationships and enter-
prises, women have been bombarded with stories warning that 
they should opt for motherhood before careerism.48 Society 
expects the new mother's primary responsibility and interest to be 
her children.49 Mothers have been warned about the harm that 
will befall their children if they are too career-oriented;50 good 
mothers are those who sacrifice their ambition for their children. 
A working mother is a good mother only if she would rather be at 
home raising her children, but must work outside the home out of 
economic necessity.51 
During this time, there was rarely, if ever, an inquiry into 
whether children needed the regular presence of some adult (not 
necessarily the mother) or whether there might be similar damage 
to a child because of a father's absence during the day. For 
example, during the January, 1991 Persian Gulf War, in which a 
number of female members of the armed services served, there 
was much concern about the effect of the separation of mothers 
from their children, but not as much concern about children's 
separation from their fathers. One article in the Washington Post 
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ists and the feminist pro-motherhood forces in 
placing the responsibility for raising children 
on mothers' doorsteps. Young African-American men are at 
greater risk of dying as the result of homicide than any other 
group of people in the United States and at greater risk of dying 
from homicide than by any other means. 54 The traditionalists 
argue that these death rates are the result of the refusal of women 
to behave in traditional ways. If they would not have sex prior to 
marriage,55 if they would act, within the marriage, in a way that 
would not alienate their husbands and drive them away,56 if they 
would acknowledge their limitations in being able to provide for 
their children materially and the necessity of having a man present 
to fulfill a fmancial role, and if they would understand the 
importance of having a man present to serve as a good "role 
model" for their sons,57 their children would grow up to be 
responsible citizens, free from high risk of death. Their failure to 
act as good women makes them bad mothers, and their bad 
motherhood harms them and their children. 
The ostensibly feminist position does not blame the poor 
African-American woman for being a bad woman. It is not, so the 
argument goes, the fault of single African-American women that 
they cannot be good mothers, they simply have not been given 
ample opportunity to do so. Better funding for education, better 
housing, greater fmancial resources in the household (especially 
if the children's fathers are ordered to pay reasonable child 
support), and better self-esteem would allow those women to be 
good mothers and for their children to have healthy childhoods. 
Nevertheless, these feminists still retain an ideal of motherhood 
that is very much akin to that of the traditionalists - they seek to 
make poor, unmarried African-American women as much like 
middle-class, married white women as possible. They assume 
both that motherhood is a desired state and that the ultimate 
responsibility for raising children rests with mothers. 58 
In addition to media images of motherhood, Freudian theory 
has significantly shaped the way American culture perceives the 
appropriate role of mothers. Persistently, psychiatrists, both in 
individual sessions with patients and in their writings,59 have 
blamed mothers as the source of virtually all major behavioral 
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disorders.60 Television talk shows, magazine stories, and daily 
conversations all leave mothers in a blame-worthy position. If 
96% of what she does is right, the 4% she does imperfectly is the 
reason for the bad things in us. 
It is difficult to state with precision what constitutes good 
and bad mothers; because of the mythological status of mothers, 
there have been subtle shifts in good mother and bad mother 
imagery over time and in particular cases. The same actions 
committed by two different women can be considered either good 
or bad. For example, is a mother who spanks her child - or 
commits against a child the same act which would be criminal if 
committed against an adult - a good mother or a bad one? Does 
the detennination lie in whether the mother loves her child, or in 
whether she says that she committed the act for a good reason? 
Actions that a mother takes which are culturally acceptable 
distinguish the good mother from the bad. Women who are able 
to reshape themselves into the myth of the good mother thereby 
become good mothers~l 
Adrienne Rich states the "unexamined assumptions" about 
motherhood: 
[A] "natural" mother is a person without further 
identity, one who can fmd her chief gratification in 
being all day with small children, living at a pace 
tuned to theirs; that the isolation of mothers and chil-
dren together in the home must be taken for granted; 
that maternal love is, and should be, quite literally 
selfless; that children and mothers are the • 'causes" 
of each others' suffering.62 
Conversely, in her book on outcomes of mothers in child 
custody disputes with their children's fathers, Phyllis Chesler des-
cribes five stock types of bad mothers: the sexual mother; the 
uppity mother; the lesbian mother; the poor mother; and the 
abused mother.63 In other words, mothers who are altruistic and 
self-sacrificing, who do not challenge the blessing of their status 
as mothers, and who behave as good women are good mothers. 
Bad mothers are those who challenge patriarchy, who live their 
lives outside prescribed codes of conduct. 
Although mothers - or at least the good ones - are the 
ones who are supposed to have the natural instinct to know what 
is best for their children and so are specially situated to care for 
them, mothers are, ultimately, not the people who set the stan-
dards for motherhood. Indeed, detennination of whether a woman 
is entitled to be a mother is set by a standard extemalIy imposed. 
At a time when women were the keepers of the hearth and home 
but had no final authority in detennining how their children 
should be cared for, they were essentially raising the children for 
the father. The father was, after all, the property owner who had 
power over issues of education, financial provision, and even 
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inheritance.64 The mother was the person who raised the children 
to be able to receive whatever their father thought was due them 
or prepared them to take hold of the property they would receive 
as adults.65 
Slave mothers in the United States are another example of 
how little control the mothers charged with rearing children 
actually had over them. Slave mothers were often charged not 
only with rearing their own children, but raising the children of 
their masters as well. In each case, these women were seen as 
having skills that would allow them to raise children well. 
Raising the children well, however, meant raising them in accord-
ance with a standard that they themselves did not set. Slave 
children were to be raised in a manner that would increase their 
value as assets to the master; white children were to be raised in 
a manner consistent with their place in the larger society. Slave 
women had no role in the creation of either of these standards. 
Today, mothers are similarly charged with raising their 
children to meet standards that they did not create. National or 
community ideals now replace the father as the entity to whom 
mothers must answer. The United States in recent years has taken 
the position that mothers must be aided in caring for their children 
as a matter of national interest; they are preparing the children for 
their inheritance of the country.66 Smaller cultural groups make 
claims that mothers are raising children for the future of the 
group.67 
The role and status of mothers are therefore elevated by an 
ideology which makes women responsible for the future of the 
country or of the cultural group.68 The force and importance of 
these stereotypes are necessary to convince women that their 
unpaid labor is natural, desired, and important.69 In an analysis 
similar to Blackstone's, women are also told that because they 
have become pregnant and have given birth, they have a natural 
obligation to raise their children. But because the state has a great 
interest in ensuring that children are raised ultimately to serve a 
national interest, the state can and does interfere in the natural 
relationship between mothers and children and, indeed, may 
tenninate the relationship altogether. 
Terminating Parental Rights 
Tennination of parental rights is usually based on parental 
abandonment, neglect, or mistreatment. 70 Generally, some type of 
hearing detennining that the child has been abandoned, neglected 
or abused, and placing the child under the jurisdiction of a court 
- but not yet tenninating parental rights - has taken place prior 
to a tennination hearing. As part of the same proceeding, or 
perhaps pursuant to a different proceeding, a parent's right to 
parent is tenninated. This means that the parent no longer has a 
right to participate in the life of the child in any way unless the 
person or agency to whom custody of the child has been granted 
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gives permission for the child to see the "bad" maternal behavior actually causes harm 
parent or have the parent be a part of the 
child's life. Mythologies 
to the child.75 Several authors have written 
about how a presumed bad effect on children 
may result in the termination of the parental 
relationship between children and those 
women who abuse alcohol and drugs/6 or 
those who are mentally ill77 or incarcerated,78 
even when there has been no showing that the 
child has been harmed. In making their deci-
sions, judges often rely on the myths of good 
mothers and bad mothers and in so doing, 
perpetuate and re-create the myths of mother-
hood. 79 Their determination that a mother is 
a bad mother (or a good one) is often pre-
As stated earlier, the relationship be-
tween parents and children is viewed as 
fundamental. According to doctrinal con-
stitutional theory then, this relationship 
should not suffer state interference absent 
some compelling state interest. 71 Constitu-
tional theory generally requires that state 
action which affects a fundamental right be 
narrowly tailored to have the least effect on 
the fundamental right while still fulfilling the 
state's interest. Termination of parental 








drastic alternatives to complete severance of 
the parent-child bond have been explored and rejected. 72 
It is understandable why some judges would manipulate or 
ignore the constitutional issues in making a decision about 
terminating the relationship between parents and children. 
Virtually all children involved in termination of parental rights 
proceedings have been harmed or are perceived to have been 
harmed by a parent; that harm justifies the state's intervention in 
the first place. Termination comes often at a point where foster 
parents or other adults wish to adopt the child or when the child 
has been in foster care for a significant period of time. The judge, 
faced with the choice between an adult who wants custody of the 
child but who has harmed the child and who lives in unfortunate 
circumstances on the one hand, and an adult who has not harmed 
the child and who often has better economic and other circumstan-
ces on the other, wants the best for the child.73 
In dealing with matters of child abuse and neglect, most 
analysts place the child at the center of their appraisal. 74 Critics 
of current statutory schema argue not that constitutional law 
principles are being upset by termination of parental rights on a 
showing ofless than a compelling state interest, but that children 
are more often than not better off if they are able to retain familial 
ties with their parents. Cases indicate, however, that constitu-
tional theory is being turned on its head in this area. Mythologies 
of good mothers are determining what is in the best interest of 
those children, and states are not required to show any harm to 
children before terminating a relationship to which parents have 
a fundamental right. 
Bad Mothers and the Termination of Parental Rights 
If a mother is viewed by a judge as bad, the mother's 
parental rights may be terminated even though there has been no 
demonstrated harm to the child. The judge may not question 
whether or not the child has been actually harmed because attor-
neys often leave unchallenged assumptions that the mother's 
Fall 1995 
rational; by feeling that a mother either fits or 
does not fit into mythical images of the good 
mother, judges determine that children should or should not be 
permanently removed from their mother's custody. 
In their decisions, judges use language that evokes emotional 
responses to the question of whether to terminate parental rights. 
This use of language is important; as writers of texts, these judges 
include those facts that they feel are necessary to understand why 
they have come to their conclusions. In cases terminating parental 
rights, however, the judges do not feel compelled to define the 
nexus between the behavior or status of the mother and the harm 
to the child. Because they assume that their readers have internal-
ized the same mythology, they often give information that appeals 
to the reader on a non-rational level: once you know this one 
piece of information about this mother (or these pieces of infor-
mation), it is clear what the result in this case should be. 
In re Luis C. 80 serves as an exemplar of how a judge's pre-
rational thinking and images of good and bad mothers resulted in 
termination of the mother's parental rights. In that case, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut was called upon to determine 
whether Luis's mother, Elba M., should have her parental rights 
terminated. The department of youth services had filed a petition 
alleging that Luis was a neglected child in April, 1982. At that 
time, Luis was eighteen months old. The petition alleged that 
Luis had been physically abused; the opinion does not describe 
the alleged abuse, nor does it indicate whether Elba or Luis's 
father was the abuser. 
One month after the petition was filed, Luis was placed into 
the home of foster parents. A hearing on the petition in Septem-
ber, 1982 determined that Luis was a neglected child. The trial 
court determined that Luis would remain in the custody of the 
department of youth services for eighteen months; that com-
mitment was extended by subsequent orders until February, 1987. 
Prior to the expiration of the trial court's order of com-
mitment in February 1987, the commission of the department of 
youth services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 
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both of Luis's parents. The petition, filed in October, 1986, 
alleged that the now-six-year-old Luis had been abandoned by his 
father,S I and that Elba's parental rights should be terminated 
because she, as the parent of a previously-adjudicated neglected 
child, had "failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation 
as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, 
considering the child's age and needs, could assume a responsible 
position in the child's life,,82 and because "there was no ongoing 
parent-child relationship."s3 The trial court terminated Elba's 
parental rights.s4 
Undoubtedly, return of Luis to Elba's custody after such a 
lengthy period of living with his foster parents would be trauma-
tizing to all the parties involved. Luis was almost seven years old 
by the date of the hearing on the petition to terminate parental 
rights, and had lived with the same foster parents since he was 
nineteen months old. Nevertheless, the theory of termination of 
parental rights states that merely determining that a child might be 
better off in the care and custody of one person rather than 
another does not justify the termination of parental rights. 
Instead, because of the fundamental nature of the relationship 
between parents and children, there should be some compelling 
state interest, namely harm to the child, which would justify state 
intrusion upon the relationship between parents and children85 and 
termination of parental rights should be the alternative most 
tailored to the state's interest in protecting the child. 
Interestingly, the appeIlate court opinion does not indicate 
that there was a fear that Luis would be physicaIly harmed ifhe 
were to return to his mother's custody. This is so even though 
physical abuse served as the basis for the original petition which 
removed Luis from his mother's care and even though the 
appellate court opinion indicates that Elba did not regularly attend 
the parenting skills classes at a local health services center.86 
Instead, the appeIlate court inspected the relationship between 
Luis and his mother at the time of the decision, and determined 
that that relationship should be severed. 
One part of the evidence used by the court in determining 
that Luis's return to his mother would be harmful was the tes-
timony of several counselors who had worked with Luis and Elba. 
One counselor testified that there was "very little interaction 
initiated by the mother with Luis" and that "Luis reacted nega-
tively toward his mother."S7 This same counselor further testified 
that "no meaningful relationship between Luis and his mother 
would be likely to develop.,,88 Another counselor testified that 
"Luis treated the respondent as a friend and not as his mother,,,s9 
while yet another characterized the relationship between Luis and 
Elba as "friendly" but not that of mother and child.90 
The appeIlate court used this testimony by the counselors to 
affIrm the trial court's decision to terminate Elba's parental rights. 
What the court does not tell us, however, is exactly what this 
testimony means. What, for example, does it mean to treat one's 
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mother as a friend? The phrase is one often heard in our society, 
and has negative connotations. But does treating another as a 
friend mean that one loves, trusts, and respects that person and 
perhaps considers the other one an equal? Does it mean that there 
was a non-hierarchical, or at least a not-so-hierarchical relation-
ship between this mother and child? If so, why should this be 
used as the basis for determining that Elba should no longer have 
access to her child? 
The idea that "mother" and "friend" are distinct relationships 
is one example of the mythical and evocative speech used to 
perpetuate images of motherhood. It is the responsibility of 
mothers to instill hierarchy within their children; mothers are 
expected to subjugate children's wills to their own, so the myth 
teIls us. From Puritan New England, where manuals advised 
parents that children, who came into the world with "stubbornness 
and stoutness of mind" must be "beaten down,,,91 to the mothers 
of the frontier West who were advised that children must be 
"broken,,,92 mothers have been told that they must not resist 
impulses to control their children, but must make their children 
conform to societal expectations. This new world expectation that 
children's lives were a preparation for their future lives, and not 
a separate and distinct time, was one that mothers were to fulfiIl.93 
Thus, just as Elba's parental rights could be terminated on 
the basis of her non-hierarchical relationship with her child, so 
too, in In re E.M ,94 was the mother's relationship with her child 
permanently severed. There, a mother's inability to control her 
children was used as a basis for termination of parental rights. As 
the caseworker who testified stated: 
If [the children] were fighting over a toy, she would 
remove the toy. When it got to issues like they were 
leaving the visiting room, it was more difficult, be-
cause the options that she was aware of and the author-
ity that she had over the children was minimal, so she 
was unable to control the children.95 
The mythology of the relationship between mother and child 
is that it must be hierarchical. There is an expectation that 
parents, and particularly mothers, will teach their children to fear 
as well as respect them, and that their children must obey author-
ity. Families which affirmatively refuse to recreate hierarchy in 
their own households are often viewed as being dysfunctional.96 
It would appear, then, that in order for a mother to be a good one, 
she must insist on having her child fear her more than she must 
insist that the child be her friend.97 
Another reason given for affirming the trial court's decision 
to terminate Elba's parental rights in In re Luis C. was based on 
the testimony of a "specialist in cultural psychiatry.,,98 The psy-
chiatrist, according to the trial court testified: 
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state, unhesitatingly, that return to a home that it would be "disastrous" for 
Luis to return to an Hispanic cul-
tural environment in light of the 
fact that Luis had spent the previ-
ous four and one-half years in an 
Anglo-American environment 
with his foster parents.99 
The mythology of 
the relationship 
between mother 
and child is that it 
because of its culture would be disastrous for 
a child. 
A fmal reason given for determining that 
it was in Luis's best interests for his relation-
ship with his mother to be permanently termi-
nated was that she had had problems obtain-
ing housing because of a lack of money and, 
although she had obtained an apartment in 
public housing, "the street on which [she] 
lived was considered the worst street in the project 
because of a high crime rate."103 In other 
The trial court does not seem to think it 
necessary to reveal what "disaster" would 
befall Luis ifhe were to return to an Hispanic 
household; it assumes that readers of the 
must be 
hierarchical. 
decision would somehow know. The court 
mentions that Luis had grown up in a non-
Hispanic foster home and that his relationship with his mother had 
suffered, but fails to indicate how Hispanic culture would 
adversely affect Luis. 
The message the court sends in its decision to terminate 
parental rights on this basis is that there is something bad, or at 
least less desirable, about Hispanic culture than Anglo culture. 
The court does not indicate that there exist language barriers 
between Luis and his mother. It does not indicate why Luis was 
not placed in a foster home in which Hispanic culture would play 
a role. loo Nonetheless, there is, by its lack of connection to any 
specific harm, an assumption that Luis wilI be harmed by his 
return to a household of color. 
What part of the mythology forms this portion of the court's 
opinion? The evocation of the image of a household of color 
creates, for many, pre-rational negative conclusions. This 
household must be worse than a white household and, given a 
choice between a white household and one of color, the white 
household should be favored. After all, it is more "normal" to be 
white than it is to be anything else in the United States. Why not 
allow a child to grow up normally then, rather than to subject him 
or her to the abnormality of being of color? Similarly, in In re 
Sanjivini K.,101 an East Indian woman stood in danger of being 
deported because her student visa had expired. The mere prospect 
of her return to India with her child prompted the filing of a 
petition for neglect. In other words, having a child live in a 
country and a culture seen as inferior to that of the United States 
is enough to show that the parent has neglected the child. 
Dorothy Roberts has written that women of color are seen as 
naturally being inferior parents. 102 Although seen as appropriate 
caretakers for white children, women of color are perceived as 
being less able to care for their own children, perhaps because 
they do not operate under the supervision and control of white 
people as they do when working in the homes of white people. 
The mythology about people of color in general, and mothers of 
color in particular, serves as a mechanism to permit a court to 
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words, it would not be a good idea for Luis to 
live with his mother because she is poor and 
cannot afford to live in a safe neighborhood. 
Again, images of mothers tell us that the best of them are not 
poor, or certainly not among the urban poor. Moral responsibility 
for poverty is an American notion that was imported from 
England. Poor laws and almshouses were created on the basis of 
the belief that poverty resulted from immorality. The trend 
continues in this country into the latter part of the twentieth 
century. The "deserving poor" are separated regularly from the 
"undeserving poor." The undeserving poor are poor because of 
their own weakness. 104 It is no accident that among those 
undeserving poor are women raising their children alone: their 
immorality is what has made them poor. 
Certainly poverty has an impact on any parent's ability to 
raise a child. StilI, there is no impetus to remove all poor children 
from their homes. Nor is it clear that being raised poor means that 
a child has been harmed. But in Luis c., the mere fact of Elba's 
poverty is used as a justification for permanently terminating her 
relationship with her child. 
We have seen, then, that a mother's being of color, being 
poor, and not abiding by hierarchical precepts of parenting may 
end her relationship with her child. The relationship between 
these factors is one falling outside the patriarchy, of being an 
outlaw against misty images of what a good woman should be. As 
a result, the perception that a mother has placed her own needs or 
desires before those of her child may also place her relationship 
with her child at risk, even though the child may be at least an 
indirect beneficiary of the acts. In In re Sanjivini K., for example, 
a mother completed her education while her child remained in 
foster care. Although she maintained contact with her child 
during the time she was in school with letters, telephone calls and 
visits, and although she completed the education plan that had 
been made a prerequisite to having her child returned to her 
custody, she was condemned by the trial court for becoming 
educated. 105 The trial court determined that her child, "instead of 
benefiting from the mother's plan, was actually 'a victim ofthe 
mother's own ambitions, however laudable."'I06 This mother is 
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painted as being powerless - a victim, not someone who made 
a choice to gain more control over. her life. Certainly children 
may benefit from having parents who have achieved educational 
goals they may set for themselves. But even if the child were not 
a beneficiary, even if the only person who were to benefit was 
Sanjivini's mother, does that mean that the child has been 
harmed? And why does that mean that the mother is a bad 
mother? 
Women whose lives and interactions with their children 
challenge patriarchy are perceived as bad women. Judges' 
perceptions of them as bad women causes them to conclude that 
they must be bad mothers, even when no harm to the child has 
been demonstrated. How, then, can judges be convinced to see 
"bad" women as "good," or at least adequate mothers when 
determining whether or not to terminate their parental rights? 
Conclusion 
Just as it is difficult to say with precision what creates the 
mythology, it is also difficult to create solutions that remove 
myths from the determination of whether the parent-child 
relationship should be terminated. Part of the problem is that 
courts, according to states' termination of parental rights statutes, 
often do not have the authority to fashion remedies that might be 
most beneficial to parents and their children, particularly if the 
parent, for some reason, cannot take full custody of the child, but 
still maintains a significant relationship with the child. lo7 Perhaps 
as Marsha Garrison has written, it may be that permanent termina-
tion of parental rights is never an adequate remedy. lOB Ifa court 
feels that the only choices it has are either to terminate parental 
rights or return a child to a dangerous home, parental rights will 
be terminated. 
In discussion about this article, a number of people have 
suggested what my law school evidence professor suggested: get 
better judges or perhaps, get more women judges. Marie Ashe 
suggests that learning more about mothers and mothering through 
reading literature would be an approach to teaching lawyers and 
judges about the emotional, psychic, and other difficulties in 
child-rearing. I09 Certainly, learning more about who real mothers 
are as opposed to culturally-created mythical mothers would be an 
important step in learning how to assess the behaviors of mothers 
and to contextualize them in terms of their real lives. 
Nevertheless, it is not necessarily the case that female judges 
will be less myth-bound in their decision-making in termination 
of parental rights cases. Gender bias reports prepared by state 
judicial systems generally do not seek to discover what role the 
gender of judges has in their decision-making, if any. I 10 Although 
female judges may bring with them particular knowledge of 
mothering to the bench, III it is not clear that they will deem it 
appropriate to draw on that knowledge in making decisions nor is 
it clear that the fact that they are mothers will not cause them to 
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hold other mothers to unrealistic standards that they believe they 
themselves have met. 112 Indeed, some studies indicate that female 
judges may adhere to cultural and societal norms in their decision-
making even more so than their male counterparts. I 13 
Statutory reform in the area might also be in order, but it is 
probably the case that the reform would still allow judges to 
misjudge women in termination of parental rights cases. In the 
general precursor to termination of parental rights for reasons 
other than abuse, namely neglect, statutory reform underwent 
major changes during the 1970s and 1980s. Instead of statutes 
which directed judges to look to parental behavior to determine 
whether a child had been neglected, 114 judges were directed to 
determine whether the child had been harmed, regardless ofthe 
parents' behavior. 115 These statutory changes have had little effect 
in the actual behavior of judges; however, in neglect cases (as 
well as child custody disputes), judges often construe bad parental 
behavior as being necessarily harmful to children. 116 Because of 
the infmite malleability of statutory construction, judges will still 
have the ability to terminate parental rights even if they may do so 
only upon an explicit showing of harm. 
If, however, judges were permitted to terminate parental 
rights only upon a showing of physical harm to a child, many 
abuses might be curtailed. Although requiring such a showing 
might result in emotional harm to a child - harm which can be as 
detrimental to a child as physical harm - it is difficult to say 
whether it is indeed the mother's behavior which is causing the 
emotional damage, especially given the high rates of mental 
illness and emotional difficulties members of the larger society 
share. 
Policy-wise, the provision of additional services in the home 
would eliminate many of the problems raised in the cases 
reviewed. If a mother does not have the financial resources to 
provide her child with a stable environment, she should be pro-
vided with those resources. If she has a drug-dependency prob-
lem, she should be provided with rehabilitative and other services 
that will provide meaningful medical assistance that takes into 
consideration her gender and her maternity. If our society truly 
believes that mothers are to be the primary caretakers for the 
'futl,lre of the country, each of them should be provided with the 
resources to do her job. 
In this discussion of motherhood, some may argue that I 
cannot speak in an authentic voice because I am not a mother. 
Nevertheless, I am a woman.1I7 To the degree that images of 
motherhood are imposed on women, images of non-motherhood 
are equally impo~.ed ~n women. IIB The societally-imposed gulf 
between mothers ~d non-mothers leaves little room for women 
to be honest about our ambivalence towards child-bearingl19 or 
our desire not to bear children, and may limit the ways in which 
we can conceive of ourselves as women. 120 Only by uncovering, 
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examining, and reclaiming motherhood may all women enjoy the 
full possibility of existence. 
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